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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
   
hank you to Lori, Mark, and ASIL for inviting me. I am truly honored 
and humbled to be here today.  
I am here today to talk about some key international law aspects of the 
United States’ ongoing armed conflict against ISIL. In so doing, I am fol-
lowing in the footsteps of others who have gone to some lengths in recent 
years to explain our government’s positions on key aspects of the law of 
armed conflict. This includes, most prominently, President Obama in his 
2013 speech at the National Defense University and his 2014 remarks at 
West Point. A number of Administration lawyers have also spoken on the-
se topics, including my predecessor, Harold Hongju Koh; former Attorney 












Johnson and Stephen Preston. The Defense Department’s promulgation of 
its Law of War Manual last year has also made a significant contribution to 
the public discourse on these issues.  
Some have said, however, that our legal approach to the counter-ISIL 
conflict has been one of the “most discussed and least understood” topics 
of U.S. practice in recent years.  
Thus, at the risk of disappointing you at the outset of this talk, I sus-
pect and hope that much of what I will say today will not be surprising. I 
also hope, however, that these remarks will provide clarity and help you 
understand better the U.S. international law approach to these important 
and consequential operations.  
International law matters a great deal in how we as a country approach 
counterterrorism operations. Prior to my confirmation, I served as a Depu-
ty White House Counsel and Legal Adviser to the National Security Coun-
cil for nearly three years. Based on my experience in that position, I can tell 
you that the President, a lawyer himself, and his national security team have 
been guided by international law in setting the strategy for counterterrorism 
operations against ISIL. I can attest personally that the President cares 
deeply about these issues, and that he goes to great lengths to be sure that 
he understands them.  
To start from first principles—the United States complies with the in-
ternational law of armed conflict in our military campaign against ISIL, as 
we do in all armed conflicts. We comply with the law of armed conflict be-
cause it is the international legal obligation of the United States; because we 
have a proud history of standing for the rule of law; because it is essential 
to building and maintaining our international coalition; because it enhances 
rather than compromises our military effectiveness; and because it is the 
right thing to do.  
I do not mean to suggest that identifying and applying key international 
law principles to this fight is easy or without controversy. The United 
States is engaged in an armed conflict with a non-State actor that controls 
significant territory, in circumstances in which multiple States and non-
State actors also have been engaging in military operations against this en-
emy, other groups, and each other for several years. These conflicts raise 
novel and difficult questions of international law that the United States is 
called to address literally on a daily basis in conducting operations.  
Of course, international law is also vitally important to other States. 
And as the President’s counterterrorism strategy has prioritized the devel-












is increasingly important for the United States to engage in what I will call 
legal diplomacy with those countries with which we partner, as well as 
those with which we may not see eye to eye. Our ability to engage and 
work with partners can and often does turn on international legal consider-
ations. We want to work with partners who will comply with international 
law, and our partners expect the same from us. In this way, international 
law serves as a critical enabler of international cooperation and joint action 
on a full range of matters, from the mundane to those that hit the front 
pages, such as the Iran nuclear deal, efforts to promote peace in Syria, mar-
itime claims in the South China Sea, data privacy, and surveillance.  
I will address three topics in my remarks. First, I will attempt to explain 
in greater detail the United States’ international legal basis for using force 
against ISIL, and some of the key rules of the law of armed conflict that 
apply to our fight against ISIL. Second, I will address how law of armed 
conflict-related considerations arise in the context of “partnered” opera-
tions—an area in which legal diplomacy is particularly critical. Third, I will 
address the interplay between law and policy in the conduct of hostilities by 
the United States—specifically those undertaken under the Presidential 
Policy Guidance that the President signed on May 22, 2013, known as the 
“PPG.”  
 
II.   JUS AD BELLUM  
 
I will begin with the United States’ international law justification for resort-
ing to the use of force, or the jus ad bellum.  
As I mentioned a few minutes ago, the United States’ armed conflict 
with ISIL is taking place in a complicated environment—one in which a 
non-State actor, ISIL, controls significant territory and where multiple 
States and non-State actors have been engaging in military operations 
against ISIL, other groups, and each other for several years. Unfortunately, 
this scenario is not unprecedented in today’s world. Iraq and Syria resemble 
other countries where multiple armed conflicts may be going on simulta-
neously—countries like Yemen and Libya.  
In such complex circumstances, States can potentially find themselves 
in more than one armed conflict or with multiple legal bases for using 
force. This complexity is why it is all the more important that we are clear 
and systematic in our thinking through how jus ad bellum principles for re-
sorting to force apply to our actions and what uses of force those princi-












The U.N. Charter identifies the key international law principles that 
must guide State behavior when considering whether to resort to the use of 
force. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides in relevant part that “[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.” Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, on the other hand, specifies that 
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.” Thus, the U.N. 
Charter recognizes the inherent right to resort to force in individual or col-
lective self-defense. Similarly, the Charter does not prohibit an otherwise 
lawful use of force when undertaken with the consent of the State upon 
whose territory the force is to be used.  
As a matter of international law, the United States has relied on both 
consent and self-defense in its use of force against ISIL. Let’s start with 
ISIL’s ground offensive and capture of Iraqi territory in June 2014 and the 
resulting decision by the United States and other States to assist with a mili-
tary response. Beginning in the summer of 2014, the United States’ actions 
in Iraq against ISIL have been premised on Iraq’s request for, and consent 
to, U.S. and coalition military action against ISIL on Iraq’s territory in or-
der to help Iraq prosecute the armed conflict against the terrorist group.  
Upon commencing air strikes against ISIL in Syria in September 2014, 
the United States submitted a letter to the U.N. Security Council explaining 
the international legal basis for our use of force in Syria in accordance with 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. As the letter explained, Iraq had made clear 
it was facing a serious threat of continuing attacks from ISIL coming out of 
safe havens in Syria and had requested that the United States lead interna-
tional efforts to strike ISIL in Syria. Consistent with the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense, the United States initiated necessary 
and proportionate actions in Syria against ISIL. The letter also articulated 
the United States’ position that Syria was unable or unwilling to effectively 
confront the threat that ISIL posed to Iraq, the United States, and our 
partners and allies.  
Thus, although the United States maintains an individual right of self-
defense against ISIL, it has not relied solely on that international law basis 
in taking action against ISIL. In Iraq, U.S. operations against ISIL are con-
ducted with Iraqi consent and in furtherance of Iraq’s own armed conflict 
against the group. And in Syria, U.S. operations against ISIL are conducted 













To say a few more words about self-defense: First, the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense recognized in the U.N. Charter is not 
restricted to threats posed by States. Nor is the right of self-defense on the 
territory of another State against non-State actors, such as ISIL, something 
that developed after 9/11. To the contrary, for at least the past two hun-
dred years, States have invoked the right of self-defense to justify taking 
action on the territory of another State against non-State actors. As but one 
example, the oft-cited Caroline incident involved the use of force by the 
United Kingdom in self-defense against a non-State actor located in the 
United States. Although the precise wording of the justification for the ex-
ercise of self-defense against non-State actors may have varied, the ac-
ceptance of this right has remained the same.  
Under the jus ad bellum, a State may use force in the exercise of its in-
herent right of self-defense not only in response to armed attacks that have 
occurred, but also in response to imminent ones before they occur.  
When considering whether an armed attack is imminent under the jus 
ad bellum for purposes of the initial use of force against a particular non-
State actor, the United States analyzes a variety of factors, including those 
identified by Sir Daniel Bethlehem in the enumeration he set forth in the 
American Journal of International Law—the ASIL’s own in-house publica-
tion—in 2012. These factors include the nature and immediacy of the 
threat; the probability of an attack; whether the anticipated attack is part of 
a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; the likely scale of the at-
tack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom in the absence 
of mitigating action; and the likelihood that there will be other opportuni-
ties to undertake effective action in self-defense that may be expected to 
cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or damage. The absence of specific 
evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an 
attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for 
purposes of the exercise of the right of self-defense, provided that there is 
a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is im-
minent.  
In the view of the United States, once a State has lawfully resorted to 
force in self-defense against a particular armed group following an actual or 
imminent armed attack by that group, it is not necessary as a matter of in-
ternational law to reassess whether an armed attack is imminent prior to 
every subsequent action taken against that group, provided that hostilities 












an important role as a matter of policy in certain U.S. counterterrorism op-
erations, even when it is not legally required.  
I’d also like to say a few words on how State sovereignty and consent 
factor into the international legal analysis when considering the use of 
force. President Obama has made clear that “America cannot take strikes 
wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, 
and respect for state sovereignty.” This is true of our operations against 
ISIL as it has been true in our non-international armed conflict against al-
Qa’ida and associated forces.  
Indeed, under the jus ad bellum, the international legal basis for the re-
sort to force in self-defense on another State’s territory takes into account 
State sovereignty. The international law of self-defense requires that such 
uses of force be necessary to address the threat giving rise to the right to 
use force in the first place. States therefore must consider whether unilat-
eral actions in self-defense that would impinge on a territorial State’s sover-
eignty are necessary or whether it might be possible to secure the territorial 
State’s consent before using force on its territory against a non-State actor. 
In other words, international law not only requires a State to analyze 
whether it has a legal basis for the use of force against a particular non-
State actor—which I’ll call the “against whom” question—but also requires 
a State to analyze whether it has a legal basis to use force against that non-
State actor in a particular location—which I’ll call the “where” question.  
It is with respect to this “where” question that international law re-
quires that States must either determine that they have the relevant gov-
ernment’s consent or, if they must rely on self-defense to use force against 
a non-State actor on another State’s territory, determine that the territorial 
State is “unable or unwilling” to address the threat posed by the non-State 
actor on its territory. In practice, States generally rely on the consent of the 
relevant government in conducting operations against ISIL or other non-
State actors even when they may also have a self-defense basis to use force 
against those non-State actors, and this consent often takes the form of a 
request for assistance from a government that is itself engaged in an armed 
conflict against the relevant group. This is the case with respect to ISIL in 
Iraq.  
Of course, the concept of consent can pose challenges in a world in 
which governments are rapidly changing, or have lost control of significant 
parts of their territory, or have shown no desire to address the threat. Thus, 












entity from whom consent should be sought. The U.S. Government care-
fully considers these issues when considering the question of consent.  
In some cases, international law does not require a State to obtain the 
consent of the State on whose territory force will be used. In particular, 
there will be cases in which there is a reasonable and objective basis for 
concluding that the territorial State is unwilling or unable to effectively 
confront the non-State actor in its territory so that it is necessary to act in 
self-defense against the non-State actor in that State’s territory without the 
territorial State’s consent. For example, in the case of ISIL in Syria, as indi-
cated in our Article 51 letter, we could act in self-defense without Syrian 
consent because we had determined that the Syrian regime was unable or 
unwilling to prevent the use of its territory for armed attacks by ISIL. This 
“unable or unwilling” standard is, in our view, an important application of 
the requirement that a State, when relying on self-defense for its use of 
force in another State’s territory, may resort to force only if it is necessary 
to do so—that is, if measures short of force have been exhausted or are 
inadequate to address the threat posed by the non-State actor emanating 
from the territory of another State.  
The unable or unwilling standard is not a license to wage war globally 
or to disregard the borders and territorial integrity of other States. Indeed, 
this legal standard does not dispense with the importance of respecting the 
sovereignty of other States. To the contrary, applying the standard ensures 
that the sovereignty of other States is respected. Specifically, applying the 
standard ensures that force is used on foreign territory without consent 
only in those exceptional circumstances in which a State cannot or will not 
take effective measures to confront a non-State actor that is using its terri-
tory as a base for attacks and related operations against other States.  
With respect to the “unable” prong of the standard, inability perhaps 
can be demonstrated most plainly, for example, where a State has lost or 
abandoned effective control over the portion of its territory from which 
the non-State actor is operating. This is the case with respect to the situa-
tion in Syria. By September 2014, the Syrian government had lost effective 
control of much of eastern and northeastern Syria, with much of that terri-
tory under ISIL’s control.  
 
III.   JUS IN BELLO  
 
In the next few minutes I’d like to shed some light on the jus in bello—the 












matter, some of our foreign partners have asked us how we classify the 
conflict with ISIL and thus what set of rules applies. Because we are en-
gaged in an armed conflict against a non-State actor, our war against ISIL is 
a non-international armed conflict, or NIAC. Therefore, the applicable in-
ternational legal regime governing our military operations is the law of 
armed conflict covering NIACs, most importantly, Common Article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other treaty and customary international 
law rules governing the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed 
conflicts.  
The rules applicable in NIACs have received close scrutiny since the 
September 11 attacks within the U.S. Government, in our courts in the 
context of ongoing litigation concerning detention and military commission 
prosecutions, and in the expanding and ever more sophisticated treatment 
that these issues receive in academia.  
I would like to clarify briefly some of the rules that the United States is 
bound to comply with as a matter of international law in the conduct of 
hostilities during NIACs. In particular, I’d like to spend a few minutes 
walking through some of the targeting rules that the United States regards 
as customary international law applicable to all parties in a NIAC:  
 
•   First, parties must distinguish between military objectives, including 
combatants, on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on the 
other. Only military objectives, including combatants, may be made the 
object of attack.  
 
•   Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective con-
tribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage. The United States has interpreted this defi-
nition to include objects that make an effective contribution to the en-
emy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capabilities.  
 
•   Feasible precautions must be taken in conducting an attack to reduce 
the risk of harm to civilians, such as, in certain circumstances, warnings 
to civilians before bombardments.  
 
•   Customary international law also specifically prohibits a number of tar-












vilian objects as such are prohibited. Additionally, indiscriminate at-
tacks, including but not limited to attacks using inherently indiscrimi-
nate weapons, are prohibited.  
 
•   Attacks directed against specifically protected objects such as cultural 
property and hospitals are also prohibited unless their protection has 
been forfeited.  
 
•   Also prohibited are attacks that violate the principle of proportionali-
ty—that is, attacks against combatants or other military objectives that 
are expected to cause incidental harm to civilians that would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipat-
ed.  
 
•   Moreover, acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is 
to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.  
 
To elaborate further and correct some possible misunderstandings re-
garding who the United States targets as an enemy in its ongoing armed 
conflicts, I’d like to explain how the United States assesses whether a spe-
cific individual may be made the object of attack.  
In many cases we are dealing with an enemy who does not wear uni-
forms or otherwise seek to distinguish itself from the civilian population. 
In these circumstances, we look to all available real-time and historical in-
formation to determine whether a potential target would be a lawful object 
of attack. To emphasize a point that we have made previously, it is not the 
case that all adult males in the vicinity of a target are deemed combatants. 
Among other things, the United States may consider certain operational 
activities, characteristics, and identifiers when determining whether an indi-
vidual is taking a direct part in hostilities or whether the individual may 
formally or functionally be considered a member of an organized armed 
group with which we are engaged in an armed conflict. For example, with 
respect to membership in an organized armed group, we may examine the 
extent to which the individual performs functions for the benefit of the 
group that are analogous to those traditionally performed by members of 
State militaries that are liable to attack; is carrying out or giving orders to 
others within the group to perform such functions; or has undertaken cer-













IV.   PARTNERSHIPS AND LEGAL DIPLOMACY  
 
I’d like to turn next to discussing the international coalitions and other 
partnerships that are critical to the fight against ISIL and the legal diploma-
cy that helps facilitate and sustain those partnerships. Sixty-six partners are 
engaged as part of the coalition that is steadily degrading ISIL. In the 
course of building and maintaining that strong coalition, we have also 
sought to navigate legal differences and find common legal ground. Some 
of our allies and partners have different international legal obligations be-
cause of the different treaties to which they are party, and others may hold 
different legal interpretations of our common obligations. Legal diplomacy 
plays a key role in building and maintaining the counter-ISIL military coali-
tion and fostering interoperability between its members. Legal diplomacy 
builds on common understandings of international law, while also seeking 
to bridge or manage the specific differences in any particular State’s inter-
national obligations or interpretations.  
Public explanations of legal positions are an important part of legal di-
plomacy. The United States is not alone in providing such public explana-
tions. Over the last eighteen months, for example, nine of our coalition 
partners have submitted public Article 51 notifications to the U.N. Security 
Council explaining and justifying their military actions in Syria against ISIL. 
Though the exact formulations vary from letter to letter, the consistent 
theme throughout these reports to the Security Council is that the right of 
self-defense extends to using force to respond to actual or imminent armed 
attacks by non-State armed groups like ISIL. Those States’ military actions 
against ISIL in Syria and their public notifications are perhaps the clearest 
evidence of this understanding of the international law of self-defense.  
More frequently, however, it is through private consultations that gov-
ernments seek to understand each other’s legal rationale for military opera-
tions. These private discussions help frame the public conversation on 
some of the central legal issues, and they are crucial to securing the vital 
cooperation of partners who want to understand our legal basis for acting. 
For example, there are times when the United States has sought the assis-
tance of key allies in taking direct action against terrorist targets, but before 
these allies would aid us, the lawyers in their foreign ministries have sought 
a better understanding of the legal basis for our operations. The prompt, 
compelling, and—at times—very early morning explanations provided by 












These conversations also go the other way. The U.S. commitment to 
upholding the law of armed conflict also extends to promoting law of 
armed conflict compliance by our partners. In the campaign against ISIL 
and beyond, coalitions and partnerships with other States and non-State 
actors are increasingly prominent features of current U.S. military opera-
tions. When others seek our assistance with military operations, we ensure 
that we understand their legal basis for acting. We also take a variety of 
measures to help our partners comply with the law of armed conflict and 
to avoid facilitating violations through our assistance. Examples of such 
measures include vetting and training recipients of our assistance and mon-
itoring how our assistance is used.  
Some have argued that the obligation in Common Article 1 of the Ge-
neva Conventions to “ensure respect” for the Conventions legally requires 
us to undertake such steps and more vis-à-vis not only our partners, but all 
States and non-State actors engaged in armed conflict. Although we do not 
share this expansive interpretation of Common Article 1, as a matter of 
policy, we always seek to promote adherence to the law of armed conflict 
generally and encourage other States to do the same. As a matter of inter-
national law, we would look to the law of State responsibility and our part-
ners’ compliance with the law of armed conflict in assessing the lawfulness 
of our assistance to, and joint operations with, those military partners.  
 
V.   LAW AND POLICY  
 
Finally, I’d like to touch on the interplay between law and policy when the 
United States takes lethal action in armed conflicts and how the United 
States often applies policy standards that exceed what the law of armed 
conflict requires.  
As a matter of international law, the United States is bound to adhere 
to the law of armed conflict. In many cases, the United States imposes 
standards on its direct action operations that go beyond the requirements 
of the law of armed conflict. For example, the U.S. military may impose an 
upper limit as a matter of policy on the anticipated number of non-
combatant casualties that is much lower than that which would be lawful 
under the rule that prohibits attacks that are expected to cause excessive 
incidental harm.  
Additionally, although the United States is not a party to the 1977 Ad-
ditional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and therefore not 












practice is already consistent with the Protocol’s provisions, which provide 
rules applicable to States parties in non-international armed conflict. This is 
a treaty that the Reagan Administration submitted to the Senate for its ad-
vice and consent to ratification, and every subsequent Administration has 
continued that support.  
I’d like to focus my comments over the next few minutes on U.S. oper-
ations to capture or employ lethal force against terrorist targets outside are-
as of active hostilities. In addition to the law of armed conflict, these opera-
tions are governed by policy guidance issued by the President in 2013. This 
policy guidance, known as the PPG, reflects this Administration’s efforts to 
strengthen and refine the process for reviewing and approving counterter-
rorism operations outside of the United States and “areas of active hostili-
ties.”  
The phrase “areas of active hostilities” is not a legal term of art—it is a 
term specific to the PPG. For the purpose of the PPG, the determination 
that a region is an “area of active hostilities” takes into account, among 
other things, the scope and intensity of the fighting. The Administration 
currently considers Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to be “areas of active hos-
tilities,” which means that the PPG does not apply to operations in those 
States.  
Substantively, the PPG imposes certain heightened policy standards 
that exceed the requirements of the law of armed conflict for lethal target-
ing. The President has done so out of a belief that implementing such 
heightened standards outside of hot battlefields is the right approach to 
using force to meet U.S. counterterrorism objectives and protect American 
lives consistent with our values.  
Of course, the President always retains authority to take lethal action 
consistent with the law of armed conflict, even if the PPG’s heightened 
policy standards may not be met. But in every case in which the United 
States takes military action, whether in or outside an area of active hostili-
ties, we are bound to adhere as a matter of international law to the law of 
armed conflict. This includes, among other things, adherence to the fun-
damental law of armed conflict principles of distinction, proportionality, 
necessity, and humanity.  
The Administration has already identified a number of the aspects in 
which the PPG imposes policy standards for the use of lethal force in 
counterterrorism operations that go beyond the requirements of the law of 
armed conflict. I’d like to focus on one key aspect here. The PPG estab-












mize risks to civilians to the greatest extent possible. In particular, the PPG 
establishes a threshold of “near certainty” that non-combatants will not be 
injured or killed. This standard is also higher than that imposed by the law 
of armed conflict, which contemplates that civilians will inevitably and trag-
ically be killed in armed conflict.  
In addition, with respect to lethal action, the PPG generally requires an 
assessment that capture of the targeted individual is not feasible at the time 
of the operation. The law of armed conflict does not itself impose any such 
“least restrictive means” obligation; instead, combatants may be targeted 
with lethal force at any time, provided that they are not “out of the fight” 
due to capture, surrender, illness, or injury.  
I hope that this discussion of the PPG and other distinctions between 
law and policy has given you an understanding not only of the difference 
between the legal and policy constraints on U.S. lethal targeting, but also 
better appreciation of the lengths this government goes to in order to min-
imize harm to civilians outside of hot battlefields while also taking the di-
rect action necessary to protect the United States, our partners, and allies.  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION  
 
In closing, I’ll speak to a final aspect of legal diplomacy, one which my 
predecessors have emphasized in their public remarks as well. As Legal 
Adviser, one of my roles is to serve as a spokesperson for the U.S. Gov-
ernment on the importance and relevance of international law, and how the 
U.S. Government interprets, applies, and complies with international law. 
Part of our legal diplomacy is carried out with our foreign counterparts be-
hind closed doors. But public legal diplomacy is a critical aspect of our 
work as well, as my predecessors—several of whom are in the audience 
today—have ably demonstrated.  
It is not enough that we act lawfully or regard ourselves as being in the 
right. It is important that our actions be understood as lawful by others 
both at home and abroad in order to show respect for the rule of law and 
promote it more broadly, while also cultivating partnerships and building 
coalitions. Even if other governments or populations do not agree with our 
precise legal theories or conclusions, we must be able to demonstrate to 
others that our most consequential national security and foreign policy de-
cisions are guided by a principled understanding and application of interna-












I hope that I have succeeded in providing some clarity today on the 
United States’ approach to international law in the counter-ISIL campaign. 
I am confident, however, that I have not answered all of your questions. 
We will seek opportunities to provide additional clarity on these issues in 
the months ahead. In the meantime, I have reserved the remainder of my 
time for questions. Thank you. 
 
 
